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This article examines the effects of the recent ﬁnan-
cial crisis, which began in August 2007, on U.S.
ﬁnancial ﬂows. Cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows are of
interest for several reasons, including the information
they provide about changes in a country’s indebted-
ness, foreign investor attitudes toward domestic as-
sets, and the current account balance. Cross-border
ﬁnancial ﬂows are the counterparts to transactions
recorded in the current account, the broadest measure
of a country’s transactions with the rest of the world.
When a country runs a deﬁcit in the current
account—as has been the case for the United States
since the early 1990s—this imbalance implies that
foreign investors must, on net, be acquiring the
country’s assets. In essence, the United States has
been borrowing from the rest of the world to ﬁnance
the excess of imports over exports.1 Foreigners’
willingness to continue investing in the United States,
and the nature of those investments, determines the
price that the United States must pay to continue
running current account deﬁcits.
U.S. ﬁnancial inﬂows typically occur through for-
eign purchases of U.S. securities, net lending to U.S.
banks and other ﬁrms, and foreign direct investment
in the United States. During the ﬁnancial crisis,
however, the composition of inﬂows changed dra-
matically, and some inﬂows came from unusual
sources.
In this article, we focus on cross-border ﬂows in
securities—both foreign purchases of U.S. securities
and U.S. purchases of foreign securities—as well as
on cross-border bank ﬂows to characterize the effect
of the crisis on net inﬂows. In addition to ﬂows, we
analyze the (related) inﬂuence of the crisis on gross
cross-border securities, banking, and nonbank
positions.2 These positions are primary components
of the net international investment position of the
United States, which measures the country’s interna-
tional ﬁnancial indebtedness. We identify three major
channels through which cross-border ﬂows and posi-
tions were affected by the crisis:
1. ‘‘ﬂight to safety’’ shifts in portfolio composition
away from riskier securities and toward invest-
ments in safe and liquid markets, particularly U.S.
Treasury securities3
2. unusual ﬂows through the banking system result-
ing from a shortage of dollar liquidity abroad and
the breakdown in interbank markets
3. a pullback from cross-border positions during the
ﬁnancial crisis, reﬂecting a general increase in risk
aversion. We ﬁnd that although both U.S. and
foreign investors did reduce their holdings of
cross-border securities and foreign deposits, the
adjustments in cross-border portfolio holdings
were relatively minor compared with the substan-
tial valuation losses that investors faced. We ﬁnd
somewhat more evidence of such a pullback in
banks’ own cross-border positions.
These channels, of course, interact in their effects
on ﬁnancial ﬂows and portfolio positions. Flight-to-
safety concerns over foreign exposure can result in
reduced cross-border positions, and risk aversion can
intensify funding pressures.
The ﬁrst section of the article addresses the ﬂight-
to-safety ﬂows of private investors out of risky secu-
rities and toward U.S. Treasury securities, as well as
the shift by official investors to an even heavier
concentration of their purchases in U.S. Treasury
securities. This section also discusses the unusual
ﬂows resulting from the ﬂight of U.S. investors out of
foreign securities. Before the crisis, ﬁnancial inﬂows
from foreign investors were typically partially offset
by outﬂows from U.S. purchases of foreign securities.
During the crisis, these ﬂows reversed.
1. Alternatively, one could argue that the desire of the rest of the
world to invest in the United States causes an imbalance that drives the
U.S. current account to be in deﬁcit.
2. We discuss only certain positions of nonbank ﬁrms. In particular,
we exclude direct investment positions.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘‘Treasury securities’’ refers to
U.S. Treasury securities.
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unusual net lending ﬂows from the United States to
Europe—through interbank markets and through li-
quidity swap lines with the Federal Reserve—in
response to a shortage of dollar liquidity abroad. This
section breaks the crisis into three distinct phases.
During the ﬁrst phase, covering the ﬁrst year of the
crisis, the majority of banking offices directed lending
to the home region of the parent bank. The second
phase, the most intense period of the crisis, can be
characterized by a breakdown of interbank markets
and cross-border borrowing of foreign central banks
from the Federal Reserve. Finally, the third phase is
the slow recovery of interbank markets in 2009. The
analysis disaggregates total net lending by nationality
of the parent bank and aggregates individual bank-
level data by banks’ lending behavior.
While the ﬁrst two sections discuss net ﬂows for
speciﬁc sectors of the ﬁnancial account, the third
section documents declines in gross cross-border
positions and a slowdown in cross-border trading
during the crisis across most instrument types associ-
ated with the ﬁnancial account (including securities,
interbank lending, borrowing and lending by nonbank
ﬁrms, and trade credit). This section shows that the
retreat from securities positions during the crisis has
been minor, but that banking and other positions have
experienced more-signiﬁcant drops.
The ﬁnal section concludes, adding a discussion of
other countries’ experiences of ﬂight to safety and
declining cross-border positions during the crisis. The
article also includes two boxes. The ﬁrst box provides
background on the data collected by the Treasury
International Capital (TIC) reporting system and on
the challenges that the crisis presented to the measure-
ment of ﬁnancial transactions and cross-border port-
folio positions (see box ‘‘The Treasury International
Capital Data Reporting System’’). For example, bank-
ruptcy ﬁlings, takeovers, and the transition of some
ﬁnancial ﬁrms to bank holding company status gener-
ated changes that made it difficult to assess whether
ﬁnancial ﬂows were being correctly reported. The
second box, ‘‘Difficulties in Assessing Market Values
of Securities during the Financial Turmoil,’’discusses
the problems inherent in determining the market
values of some cross-border securities positions when
trading becomes extremely thin.
FLIGHT-TO-SAFETY SHIFTS IN PORTFOLIOS
DURING THE CRISIS
In recent years before the crisis, most of the inﬂows to
the United States occurred through foreign acquisi-
tions of U.S. securities. These foreign acquisitions,
representing net purchases both by foreign private
investors and by foreign official investors, typically
amounted to more than the current account deﬁcit
(ﬁgure 1). Foreign private investors include foreign
banks, non-government-operated investment funds,
and foreign corporations, as well as individual inves-
tors. Foreign official investors are primarily foreign
central banks and ﬁnance ministries but also include
investment funds operated by central governments
(so-called sovereign wealth funds). During the crisis,
both types of investors exhibited ﬂight to safety in
their securities portfolios, with the result that total
foreign purchases of U.S. securities fell below the
current account deﬁcit. This section discusses that
ﬂight to safety and the unusual ﬂows resulting from
the ﬂight of U.S. investors out of foreign securities,
which made up, in part, for the gap between the
current account deﬁcit and foreign purchases of U.S.
securities.
Increased Purchases of U.S. Treasury
Securities
As concerns rose over the risks associated with
various U.S. securities that were structured around
U.S. subprime loans and other forms of real estate
loans and consumer credit during the summer of
2007, foreign investors began to acquire increasing
amounts of U.S. Treasury securities, with correspond-
ing movements out of other, riskier securities. We
interpret these movements in cross-border portfolios
1. Foreign net purchases of U.S. securities, by type of  
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portfolio ﬂows and positions is the data collected by the
Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system.
The TIC system includes monthly and quarterly data
collected in aggregate by country, broad instrument type,
and type of foreign counterparty, as well as periodic (now
annual) in-depth surveys of cross-border holdings of both
long- and short-term securities.
1
Components of the TIC System
Information on foreign purchases of U.S. long-term secu-
rities and on U.S. purchases of foreign long-term securi-
ties is collected monthly on the TIC S form. Data are
collected on foreign gross purchases and gross sales by
country for four types of long-term U.S. securities: U.S.
Treasury debt securities, U.S. agency debt securities, U.S.
debt securities issued by all other institutions (primarily
corporate issuers), and U.S. equity. These data distinguish
foreign official purchases of U.S. securities from pur-
chases by other foreigners. The TIC S form also reports
U.S. cross-border purchases and sales of foreign long-
term debt and equity, again by country. For analytical
purposes, the sales of each type of security are usually
subtracted from gross purchases to measure net transac-
tions.
The TIC B forms collect data on cross-border positions
in the form of deposits, loans, brokerage balances, and
repurchase agreements. Although these data are com-
monly referred to as the TIC banking data, they also
include positions reported by other depository institu-
tions, by bank and ﬁnancial holding companies, and by
securities brokers and dealers. The TIC B forms also
collect selected data on cross-border holdings of short-
term securities, such as short-term Treasury bills and
certiﬁcates, commercial paper, and negotiable certiﬁcates
of deposit. Like the TIC S data, the TIC B data are
reported by country and by type of foreign counterparty.
Cross-border positions of nonbanks (including entities
such as exporters and importers, industrial ﬁrms, insur-
ance companies, and pension funds) are collected quar-
terly by country on the TIC C forms. These forms
distinguish between ‘‘ﬁnancial’’ claims and liabilities
(such as deposits, short-term securities, and loans) and
‘‘commercial’’ claims and liabilities (such as accounts
receivable or payable arising from import or export
activities).
In addition to the monthly and quarterly data, more-
comprehensive data on foreign holdings of U.S. securities
and U.S. holdings of foreign securities are available from
detailed annual surveys of cross-border portfolios. Be-
cause the annual survey data are collected at the indi-
1. For further information on the TIC system for collecting cross-
border ﬁnancial data, see Carol C. Bertaut, William L. Griever, and Ralph
W. Tryon (2006), ‘‘Understanding U.S. Cross-Border Securities Data,’’
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 92 (May), pp. A59–A75,
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/cross_border_securities.pdf.
vidual security level, the surveys can provide consider-
able additional information on cross-border securities
holdings, including greater detail on the types of securi-
ties held, their maturity structure, and the face and market
values of the individual securities.
Financial Accounts of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and Adjustments to the TIC Data
The TIC data, including both the monthly and quarterly
data as well as the annual surveys, are the primary source
data for many of the items in the official international
ﬁnancial transactions accounts compiled by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). In our analysis, we use esti-
mates at a monthly frequency, prepared by staff members
at the Federal Reserve Board, that are similar to those
reported by the BEA. These ﬂows may differ somewhat
from the underlying as-reported TIC data, because the
BEA and the Board’s staff adjust reported ﬂows to
reconcile the information obtained from the monthly and
quarterly data with that obtained in the annual surveys
and other data sources. In particular, net purchases of
securities attributed to foreign official investors are larger
in this analysis than in the underlying TIC data because
the TIC S data do not identify as foreign official acquisi-
tions those that occur through foreign private intermedi-
aries. Because of these additional acquisitions, when a
new survey of foreign holdings of U.S. securities is
conducted, foreign official holdings of U.S. securities are
often revealed to be larger than would be estimated from
summing official net purchases since the previous survey.
Complications from the Financial Crisis in Assessing
Correct TIC Reporting
Aspects of the crisis itself have complicated the measure-
ment of ﬁnancial transactions and cross-border portfolio
positions. In particular, bankruptcy ﬁlings and mergers
and takeovers of major market participants generated
changes in reporter panels as well as some unusual
unwinding of positions that made it difficult to assess
whether ﬁnancial ﬂows were being correctly reported.
For example, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. held large
cross-border positions in repurchase agreements, in which
they lent securities to foreign banks in exchange for a
cash loan. In order to correctly measure ﬁnancial ﬂows, it
was necessary to determine the resolution of these and
other such positions—that is, whether securities changed
hands as a result of failure to repay, whether positions
were taken over by companies acquiring subsets of
Lehman’s business, or whether the positions are still
pending bankruptcy court outcomes.
In addition, changes in reporter classiﬁcations resulting
from the creation of several bank holding companies
generated new reporting responsibilities, which in turn
generated inconsistent deﬁnitions of data series and fur-
ther complicated the analysis of ﬁnancial ﬂows.
The Treasury International Capital Data Reporting System
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ﬂight-to-safety portfolio motives. These movements
became more pronounced with the intensiﬁcation of
the crisis in the fall of 2008 but reversed somewhat
with the stabilization of ﬁnancial markets through the
ﬁrst half of 2009.
Although foreign investors historically have held a
large share of U.S. Treasury securities, most of these
securities are held by official investors and, in large
part, reﬂect official reserve holdings. Official holdings
of U.S. Treasury securities grew especially rapidly
between 2002 and mid-2007—more than doubling
from roughly $700 billion to more than $1.6 tril-
lion—as many Asian central banks acquired large
amounts of dollar reserves over this period (ﬁgure 2).
U.S. Treasury securities make up a much smaller
share of foreign private portfolios and typically have
accounted for a much smaller fraction of foreign
private investors’ purchases of U.S. securities: U.S.
Treasury securities accounted for only about 12 per-
cent of foreign private investors’ securities holdings
in 2003 and for less than 10 percent in 2006.Although
foreign private investors made large purchases of
Treasury securities during months of market turbu-
lence (for example, in August 2007 and April 2008),
they did not noticeably shift their purchases into such
securities until the intensiﬁcation of the crisis in the
fall of 2008 (ﬁgure 3, solid bars). Foreign private
monthly purchases reached a record $93 billion in
October 2008 and remained sizable through the ﬁrst
quarter of 2009.
Identifying the foreign counterparties for these
recent large private purchases of Treasury securities
is difficult. The TIC system that collects the underly-
ing data for transactions in long-term securities is
designed to record transactions between U.S. resi-
dents and their direct cross-border counterparties, not
the ultimate investors. Thus, if an investor in France
purchases a Treasury security but the transaction is
booked through a London intermediary, the TIC
system will report a sale of U.S. Treasury securities to
the United Kingdom, not France. This example high-
lights the ‘‘ﬁnancial center bias’’in the data: Roughly
one-third of all purchases and sales of U.S. long-term
securities in the TIC system are recorded against the
United Kingdom, with nearly as many recorded col-
lectively against the Caribbean ﬁnancial centers of
the Bahamas, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands.
Nonetheless, in both the summer of 2007 and the
fall of 2008, net purchases of Treasury securities by
entities in the Caribbean banking centers, especially
the Cayman Islands, picked up notably. This increase
in Treasury acquisitions is consistent with shifts in the
portfolios of hedge funds and other investment funds
located in these offshore ﬁnancial centers to safer and
more-liquid investments during periods of pro-
nounced market turmoil. More recently, foreign pri-
vate investors have reduced their purchases of Trea-
sury securities, and net purchases of such securities
through Caribbean ﬁnancial centers have reversed to
net sales. These developments may indicate increased
risk tolerance and a diminution of ‘‘safe haven’’
ﬂows.
Foreign official investors also increased their pur-
chases of Treasury securities, especially in the second
half of 2008, and their acquisitions of these securities
have remained high in 2009 (ﬁgure 3, white bars).
Total foreign acquisitions of Treasury securities (offi-
cial and private purchases combined) amounted to
more than $1 trillion in the two years since summer
2007, raising estimated total foreign holdings to
nearly $3.4 trillion by mid-2009. However, because
the issuance of Treasury securities has been heavy
2. Total foreign holdings and foreign official holdings  
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A150 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009over the past two years, these record foreign acquisi-
tions have not resulted in foreign investors acquiring
a disproportionate share of U.S. Treasury securities
outstanding. As of June 2009, foreign investors were
estimated to hold about 58 percent of the marketable
Treasury debt held by the public, a share about
unchanged from June 2006 (ﬁgure 4).4
Foreign holdings of Treasury securities typically
have been concentrated in long-term bonds and
notes—that is, securities with an original maturity of
more than one year. However, with the onset of the
ﬁnancial turmoil, a much larger fraction of both
foreign official and foreign private acquisitions of
Treasury securities has been Treasury bills: From
June 2007 through June 2009, total foreign holdings
of Treasury bills increased more than $625 billion, to
more than $850 billion, accounting for about two-
thirds of the total increase in foreign holdings of
Treasury securities. More than one-half of these
short-term Treasury securities were acquired during
the turbulent market conditions last fall. In part,
increased foreign holdings of short-term Treasury
securities reﬂect changes to the issuance patterns of
Treasury debt last fall: Newly issued Treasury bills
accounted for much more of the increase in debt
outstanding than has been typical in recent years
(ﬁgure 4, top panel). Nonetheless, the share of short-
term Treasury bills held by foreign investors has risen
slightly over the past couple of years, from about
38 percent before the onset of the crisis to about
43 percent as of June 2009 (ﬁgure 4, bottom panel).
Sharply Reduced Purchases of Other Types
of U.S. Securities
Although foreign private investors had made rela-
tively small purchases of Treasury securities prior to
the turmoil, they had made sizable acquisitions of
other, riskier securities. Indeed, in 2005, 2006, and
the ﬁrst half of 2007, foreign private investors’
acquisitions of long-term securities other than Trea-
sury securities had accounted for the bulk of ﬁnancial
inﬂows. Their purchases, on net, of these other secu-
rities dropped to essentially zero in the ﬁrst half of
2008 and reversed to sizable net sales in the second
half of the year (ﬁgure 5). Foreign investors contin-
4. We construct total marketable Treasury debt held by the public as
the total marketable Treasury debt outstanding and held by the public
as reported by the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United
States, minus Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve System
in the System Open Market Account.
4. U.S. Treasury securities outstanding, and foreign  
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in early 2009 but resumed purchasing U.S. equity,
especially in the second quarter.
Much of the falloff in foreign purchases of other
types of securities reﬂects markedly reduced pur-
chasesofU.S.corporatedebtsecurities:Afteramount-
ing to more than $500 billion of foreign inﬂows in
2006 and nearly $350 billion in the ﬁrst six months of
2007, foreign private net purchases of U.S. corporate
debt totaled less than $50 billion from summer 2007
through the end of 2008.
The reduction in U.S. corporate debt issuance since
mid-2007 may have been a factor contributing to the
marked slowdown in foreign net purchases of corpo-
rate debt securities over this period and especially in
the fourth quarter of 2008. Foreign purchases of U.S.
corporate debt partly reﬂect acquisitions of newly
issued debt, and foreign gross purchases are corre-
lated with U.S. corporate bond issuance (ﬁgure 6).
Even as lower corporate issuance reduced foreign
gross purchases of U.S. corporate debt, however,
foreign sales of debt remained high because foreign
gross sales of U.S. corporate debt partly reﬂect
redemptions of maturing securities. According to the
detailed survey data, roughly 8 percent of corporate
debt held by foreign investors over the past two years
had a remaining maturity of less than one year. With
total foreign holdings of corporate debt amounting to
$2.7 trillion as of June 2007 and to $2.8 trillion as of
a year later, redemptions of maturing debt amount to
about $225 billion in each of those years and are thus
recorded in the TIC system as sales of U.S. corporate
debt by foreign residents. As new issuance of U.S.
corporate debt slowed sharply, especially in the sec-
ond half of 2008, net sales by foreign investors may
have been explained, in part, by limited acquisitions
of newly issued debt that were insufficient to offset
the maturing bonds in their portfolios. But at the same
time, net sales by foreign investors also indicated
weak foreign demand for such securities, as limited
issuance of U.S. corporate debt largely reﬂected weak
demand by investors, including foreign investors.
Much of the previous foreign demand for long-
term corporate debt appears to have been for corpo-
rate asset-backed securities (ABS), including sizable
acquisitions of corporate mortgage-backed securities.
Although the monthly transactions data over this
period do not distinguish transactions in corporate
ABS from transactions in other corporate debt securi-
ties, we can use information from the detailed surveys
of foreign holdings of U.S. securities to learn more
about the types of securities acquired. According to
the survey data, foreign investors’ holdings of corpo-
rate ABS increased by more than $300 billion be-
tween June 2006 and June 2007, accounting for more
than 40 percent of the total increase in holdings of
corporate debt securities. At $902 billion, foreigners’
holdings of corporate ABS accounted for about one-
third of their holdings of corporate debt securities by
the end of June 2007.5
By June 2008, however, foreign investors held only
$760 billion in U.S. corporate ABS, about $150 bil-
lion less than they did the year before. In large part,
the notably lower foreign holdings in June 2008
reﬂect sizable valuation losses on these securities:
Compared with the relative stability in their prices
over the previous 12 months, prices of corporateABS
fell roughly 13.5 percent by mid-2008 (see box
‘‘Difficulties inAssessing Market Values of Securities
during the Financial Turmoil’’). The underlying sur-
vey data indicate somewhat lower aggregate holdings
of these securities as well. Nonetheless, foreign inves-
tors also appear to have continued buying some U.S.
corporate ABS between the two surveys. Of the
$760 billion in corporate ABS held in June 2008,
about $215 billion reﬂects securities that were not
held in 2007, including roughly $105 billion in
securities issued over the 12-month period. In con-
trast, roughly $280 billion in individual corporate
ABS held in 2007 was no longer held by June 2008.
Foreign investors did not substantially change their
total holdings of short-term U.S. corporate debt
5. The underlying survey data indicate that most of the increase in
the value of total foreign investment in U.S. corporate ABS between
June 2006 and June 2007 appears to have arisen from increased
foreign holdings rather than from valuation changes: The average
effective price increase in these securities during that period was only
about 11⁄2 percent.
6. U.S. issuance, and foreign gross purchases, of U.S.  
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holdings of U.S. securities and U.S. holdings of foreign
securities collect data both at face value (or, for equity,
number of shares) and at market value as of the survey
date (end of June for foreign holdings of U.S. securities
and end of December for U.S. holdings of foreign securi-
ties). As part of the comprehensive process for reviewing
the survey data, prices assigned to individual securities
are crosschecked across survey respondents and with
commercial data sources to verify the assigned market
values. For securities such as Treasury securities or
commonly traded U.S. equities, determining the correct
price as of the survey dates is fairly straightforward:
Because these securities trade in large, liquid markets,
prices for the securities are readily available and easily
veriﬁable.
If we want to understand how cross-border portfolios
were affected by valuation gains or losses as the ﬁnancial
crisis unfolded, however, we need to be able to estimate
such valuation changes for dates other than those of the
surveys. This requirement is especially true for estimating
valuation effects for foreign holdings of U.S. securities,
because the most recent survey collected holdings in June
2008, before the intensiﬁcation of the crisis in the fall of
2008. Estimating valuation gains or losses for periods
beyond survey dates is a somewhat more complicated
process because the composition of investor portfolios
may change over the period. However, foreign holdings
of most classes of U.S. securities such as U.S. Treasury
securities and equities in aggregate are similar to the
composition of standard price indexes of U.S. Treasury
securities or of equities weighted by market capitaliza-
tion. Thus, to create estimates of foreign holdings of U.S.
securities for nonsurvey dates, we update the survey
values of holdings with net purchases as recorded in the
monthly transactions data, and we apply aggregate price
indexes to these estimates to adjust for valuation gains or
losses over nonsurvey intervals. Similarly, we can esti-
mate valuation gains or losses on U.S. holdings of foreign
equity and foreign debt by applying foreign equity and
bond price indexes to our holdings of foreign securities.
1
However, market conditions during the ﬁnancial tur-
moil made the task of assessing market prices of securi-
ties that became very thinly traded extremely difficult,
even on survey dates. This problem was especially true
for corporate asset-backed securities (ABS), for which
the difficulty was compounded by the very large number
of securities involved. ABS typically are issued in differ-
ent tranches. Each tranche is usually relatively small, and
different risk characteristics may be associated with each
tranche. As a result, many securities that superﬁcially
appear similar because they are issued by the same ABS
issuer on the same date can have very different market
1. For more detail on how to construct monthly estimates of securities
positions accounting for net transactions and valuation changes, see Carol
C. Bertaut and Ralph W. Tryon (2007), ‘‘Monthly Estimates of U.S.
Cross-Border Securities Positions,’’ International Finance Discussion
Papers 910 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, November), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2007/910/
ifdp910.pdf.
values because of their different risk characteristics, a fact
that makes crosschecking and verifying prices across
reporters and with commercial data sources considerably
more difficult. Furthermore, prices were more difficult to
obtain for someABS—particularly those in smaller, more
risky tranches—than for others. As market functioning
forABS became impaired, tracking prices became harder,
especially for these more risky tranches. And although
riskier tranches tend to be smaller, they are numerous and
in aggregate can account for a sizable portion of cross-
border positions. For example, the June 2008 survey of
foreign holdings of U.S. securities identiﬁed roughly
8,000 individual ABS with face values of more than
$25 million. These 8,000 securities accounted for roughly
three-fourths of the total face value of corporateABS held
by foreigners. But more than 28,000 individual ABS,
each with a face value of $25 million or less, collectively
accounted for the remaining one-fourth of corporate ABS
held. A further complication has been that many ABS—
particularly those issued in the Cayman Islands and held
by U.S. investors—were privately placed, with little
information on the price of the securities even at issue, let
alone on the price as of the survey date.
ABS price indexes can provide some guidance on how
ABS prices are likely to have moved between surveys,
besides providing a means to estimate more recent valua-
tion gains or losses. Because roughly two-thirds of U.S.
corporateABS held by foreign investors was ﬂoating-rate
debt, using an average of an index of ﬂoating-rate ABS,
such as the Barclays Capital U.S. Floating-Rate Asset-
Backed Securities Index, and an index of ﬁxed-rate ABS,
such as the Barclays Capital U.S. Asset-Backed Securities
Index, is a reasonable guide to estimating current valuation
effects. By this measure, prices for U.S. corporate ABS
were little changed between June 2006 and June 2007 but
fell roughly 13 percent between July 2007 and June 2008;
they had declined a further 18 percent by year-end 2008
(ﬁgure A). Although these price declines are sizable, they
may actually understate total foreign losses on U.S.
corporate ABS, as the indexes themselves capture price
changes only for securities that are actively traded.
Difficulties in Assessing Market Values of Securities during the Financial Turmoil
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long-term debt, the asset-backed portion of foreign
holdings declined. In mid-2007, asset-backed com-
mercial paper (ABCP) accounted for nearly 40 per-
cent of foreign holdings of U.S. short-term corporate
debt. By mid-2008, this ﬁgure had declined to about
25 percent. Starting in the third quarter of 2008, as
short-term funding markets ceased normal function-
ing, foreign investors did decrease their overall posi-
tions in short-term U.S. corporate debt. Such posi-
tions dropped about 30 percent between June and
December of 2008 and continued falling more gradu-
ally in 2009, losing another 10 percent by June 2009.
Foreign private investors also slowed their net
purchases of U.S. government agency debt and equity
in the second half of 2007, turning to net sales of
these securities in 2008. However, the magnitude of
this reversal was considerably less dramatic than the
marked slowdown in net purchases of corporate debt
securities. Although concerns about the ﬁnancial
viability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac gained
particular market attention in the summer of 2008,
foreign private investors had been net sellers of
agency securities since mid-2007. Foreign private
interest in agency debt does not appear to have been
affected by the move in September 2008 to place
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, as
foreign private net sales of agency securities have
continued thus far in 2009, though at a somewhat
slower pace than in the previous few quarters.
Although foreign private purchases of U.S. equity
did show some sizable swings during months of more
pronounced market turmoil, foreign acquisitions, on
net, were not affected to the same degree as were
foreign purchases of corporate debt securities. For-
eign purchases of equity remained sizable in the
second half of 2007. And despite the sharp drop in
U.S. equity prices in the fall of 2008, foreign inves-
tors made only limited net sales of U.S. stocks,
though, as we discuss in the section ‘‘Marked Slow-
down in Cross-Border Securities Trading’’(p. A162),
gross trading in U.S. equity was sharply curtailed.
More recently, foreign investors have returned to
purchasing U.S. equity.
Portfolio Shifts for Foreign Offıcial Investors
Foreign official investment has typically occurred
through purchases of U.S. Treasury securities, but in
recent years, official investors began to acquire an
increasing amount of U.S. agency securities (ﬁg-
ure 7). For the period 2005 through summer 2007,
official purchases of agency securities accounted for
about one-half of all official inﬂows. During this
period, foreign official purchases of agency securities
accounted for more than two-thirds of the net issu-
ance of agency debt.
The composition of foreign official inﬂows was
little affected by the onset of ﬁnancial turmoil in
mid-2007 but changed markedly with the intensiﬁca-
tion of the turmoil in the second half of 2008. As we
saw with foreign private investors, official investors
made large net purchases of Treasury securities and
net sales of other types of securities beginning in
summer 2008. However, some special factors inﬂu-
enced the timing and extent of the shift in the
composition of official inﬂows.
Official net purchases of agency securities re-
mained strong in 2007 and through the ﬁrst half of
2008 but began to weaken as concerns about Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac began to surface in July 2008.
Beginning in July 2008, most official investors ap-
peared to allow maturing issues of long-term agency
securities in their portfolios to be redeemed without
making offsetting new purchases, resulting in a small
net decline in their holdings of agency securities.
From October 2008 through the end of that year,
however, some official investors made sizable out-
right sales of their holdings of agency securities as
they intervened to support their currencies. These
outright sales of agency securities continued through
the end of 2008 and contributed to an unusual net
outﬂow from official investors for the quarter.
Official investors had also acquired increasing
amounts of other U.S. securities, primarily U.S. cor-
porate stocks and bonds, in 2006 and the ﬁrst half of
2007. These official inﬂows largely reﬂect acquisi-
tions by sovereign wealth funds willing to invest in
somewhat riskier U.S. securities. Although inﬂows
7. Foreign official net purchases of U.S. securities,  












Billions of U.S. dollars, annual rate
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
NOTE: All other consists of long-term corporate debt and equity. See also





A154 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009into such securities actually picked up in the second
half of 2007 and the ﬁrst half of 2008, they, too,
reﬂect aspects of the ﬁnancial turmoil: Official pur-
chases in late 2007 and early 2008 were boosted by
the well-publicized injections of capital by some
sovereign wealth funds into U.S. ﬁnancial institutions
as the ﬁnancial crisis unfolded.
So far in 2009, official inﬂows have remained
sizable, but they continue to be concentrated in U.S.
Treasury securities.
Flight-to-Safety Shifts in Securities Portfolios
of U.S. Investors
U.S. purchases of foreign securities are outﬂows in
the ﬁnancial account and thus typically offset some of
the ﬁnancial inﬂows recorded through foreign official
and foreign private purchases of U.S. securities. U.S.
investors had acquired increasing amounts of foreign
stocks and bonds from 2004 through the ﬁrst half of
2007. They continued to acquire foreign securities
through the ﬁrst half of 2008, though at a reduced
pace, but began to sell foreign securities in the
summer of 2008 (ﬁgure 8). These record sales of
foreign securities in the second half of 2008 provided
a ﬁnancial inﬂow to the United States, making up, in
part, for the gap between the current account deﬁcit
and foreign purchases of U.S. securities evident in
ﬁgure 1.
Increased risk aversion and an interest in reducing
foreign exposure (a form of ﬂight to safety) are likely
motivations for the pullback in U.S. investors’ hold-
ings of foreign securities, especially investments in
foreign equity, which are the bulk of U.S. external
securities portfolios. U.S. investors continued to
acquire foreign equity through the ﬁrst half of 2008
but made fairly sizable net sales of foreign equity in
the second half of 2008 as foreign stock markets
plunged.
U.S. residents’ net purchases of foreign bonds
slowed notably in the ﬁrst half of 2008 and reversed
to large net sales in the second half of that year. As
with foreign purchases of U.S. corporate bonds, the
deterioration in U.S. purchases of foreign bonds may
reﬂect, in part, weak global debt issuance since the
onset of the turmoil. Another similarity to the foreign
sales of U.S. corporate debt is an apparent reduction
in U.S. demand for foreign-issuedABS.Although the
majority of foreign debt securities owned by U.S.
investors are conventional debt securities issued by
foreign governments and corporations, a sizable por-
tion of the increase in U.S. investors’ holdings of
foreign long-term debt between 2005 and the onset of
the crisis came from increased purchases of foreign-
issued ABS.6 Of the $720 billion in foreign private-
sector debt held by U.S. residents at year-end 2005,
about $131 billion, or roughly 18 percent, consisted
of foreign-issued ABS. By the end of 2007, total
holdings of foreign private-sector debt had grown to
$1.2 trillion, and holdings of foreign ABS had more
than doubled, increasing to $330 billion, which
accounted for 27 percent of foreign private-sector
debt held.
By December 2008, U.S. investors’ holdings of
foreign private-sector debt had declined to $945 bil-
lion, and holdings of foreign ABS had decreased to
$231 billion. As with foreign holdings of U.S.-issued
corporate ABS, much of the decline in the market
value of holdings of foreign ABS between 2007 and
2008 reﬂects sizable estimated valuation losses on
this debt: Between December 2007 and December
2008, prices of these securities are estimated to have
fallen roughly 25 percent.
U.S. residents’ holdings of foreign-issued short-
term debt also grew rapidly in the years before the
crisis, reaching $368 billion by December 2006.
Much of this increase likely reﬂected increased hold-
ings of foreignABCP: The share of commercial paper
(ABCP and unsecured) in these holdings increased
from about 15 percent in December 2003 to almost
50 percent in December 2006. This fraction stayed
6. Much of this foreign-issued ABS was backed, at least in part, by
U.S. loans; this characteristic of foreign-issued ABS was especially
true for U.S. holdings of ABS issued through the Cayman Islands,
which amounted to nearly $200 billion in December 2007. For further
information, see Daniel O. Beltran, Laurie Pounder, and Charles
Thomas (2008), ‘‘Foreign Exposure to Asset-Backed Securities of
U.S. Origin,’’ International Finance Discussion Papers 939 (Washing-
ton: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August),
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2008/939/ifdp939.pdf.
8. U.S. net purchases of foreign securities, by type of  
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2008, while total holdings of short-term foreign debt
dropped. Overall, from the onset of the crisis in
August 2007 through March 2009, U.S. holdings of
short-term foreign debt declined by about one-third.
With an easing of tensions in ﬁnancial markets, an
improved environment for foreign bond issuance, and
a recovery in global equity markets so far this year,
U.S. residents have resumed purchases of both for-
eign stocks and bonds.
BANKING DEVELOPMENTS
Banks’ cross-border positions (which include some
positions of securities brokers) are quite volatile, and
large net ﬂows for a given month are not unusual.
Over longer periods of time, however, banking usu-
ally contributes little to net U.S. ﬁnancial ﬂows, as
was the case for the period 2004 through early 2007
(ﬁgure 9, solid bars). However, since mid-2007,
cross-border banking ﬂows have exhibited unusual
patterns that reﬂect features of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Even as the crisis slowed the growth in gross
positions, net changes in positions showed a substan-
tial increase in net lending abroad, or outﬂows,
between mid-2007 and mid-2008. These outﬂows
were followed by a large inﬂow between September
and December 2008 as previous net lending was
retracted; ﬁnally, renewed sizable outﬂows from Janu-
ary to June 2009 reﬂected a resurgence in net lending.
Over the whole period from August 2007 to
June 2009, new net lending abroad by banks in the
United States cumulated to about $480 billion.
This pattern was driven mainly by signiﬁcant U.S.
dollar liquidity needs of European banks. Through
much of the crisis, banks located in the United States
played a primary role in funding dollar needs abroad.
During the height of the crisis in the fall of 2008,
however, foreign central banks provided dollars,
drawn from their swap lines with the Federal Reserve,
to foreign banks directly. This section will elaborate
on these unusual ﬂows from banking and the official
swap lines (ﬁgure 9, white bars).
Background on Cross-Border Banking
Positions
Gross cross-border positions reported by banks in the
United States are sizable: Gross cross-border claims
and liabilities each represent just more than one-ﬁfth,
respectively, of U.S.-owned assets abroad (claims)
and foreign-owned assets in the United States (liabili-
ties) in the U.S. international investment position. At
the end of 2007, these positions amounted to about
$3.8 trillion in gross claims on foreigners and about
$4.2 trillion in gross liabilities to private foreigners.
Most of these positions, about 80 percent on each
side, are banks’ own claims and liabilities. We report
banks’ own gross positions in recent years (ﬁgure 10).
The remaining 20 percent of the positions are banks’
holdings of short-term securities and deposits on
behalf of customers, which are discussed elsewhere in
this article.7
7. Changes in customers’ short-term securities portfolios are dis-
cussed earlier in the section ‘‘Flight-to-Safety Shifts in Portfolios
during the Crisis’’ (p. A148). The decline in customers’ banking
9. U.S. cross-border net banking flows for banks’ own  
accounts, and central bank swap flows and other U.S.  
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10. Banking offices in the United States: Banks’ own  
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A156 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009Banks’ own cross-border claims consist mainly of
deposits with foreign banks, loans, resale agreements,
and their holdings of foreign certiﬁcates of deposit
(CDs) and short-term securities. Banks’ own cross-
border liabilities consist mainly of deposits by for-
eigners and repurchase agreements (repos).Asubstan-
tial fraction—more than two-thirds—of banks’ own
cross-border positions are with affiliated banking
offices abroad (that is, intercompany positions).
By deﬁnition, banking offices located in the United
States include both U.S.-owned banks and U.S.
officesofforeign-ownedbanks.Therefore,forforeign-
owned banks in the United States, affiliated offices
abroad include the parent office. Gross U.S. cross-
border positions are roughly split between U.S.-
owned banks and offices of banks headquartered in
Europe (ﬁgure 11). Banking offices with headquarters
elsewhere (primarily Asia, Canada, and Australia)
account for less than 10 percent of gross positions.
For several years before the crisis, U.S.-owned
banks, as a group, were substantial net borrowers
from abroad, which means that their liabilities ex-
ceeded their claims (ﬁgure 12, top panel, shaded
area). However, this position was fairly stable, with
little new net borrowing or lending over the 2004 to
2006 period. Offices of foreign-based banks, which
are primarily European, maintained a more neutral
cross-border position in the pre-crisis period: Claims
were nearly equal to liabilities (ﬁgure 12, bottom
panel). These positions also created little new net
borrowing or lending before 2007.
Increased Net Lending through Mid-2008
Normally, banks generate little net ﬂows, meaning
little new net borrowing or lending, because banks’
gross cross-border liabilities to foreigners and gross
cross-border claims on foreigners typically grow at
about the same rate. However, between mid-2007 and
mid-2008, a substantial gap opened between the paths
of liabilities and claims (ﬁgure 13, top panel). New
net lending, by our deﬁnition, occurs when claims
rise relative to liabilities, regardless of the absolute
position of claims and liabilities initially. Figure 13
illustrates new net lending by showing the cumulative
changes in claims and liabilities. At its peak in early
fall of 2008, this gap cumulated to about $430 billion
in new net lending abroad by banks located in the
United States since January 2007, about $390 billion
of which occurred between August 2007 and August
2008. The gap then narrowed dramatically through
the fall of 2008, retracting nearly 80 percent of that
lending, but opened again beginning in January 2009,
positions is discussed in a later section, ‘‘Reductions in Foreign
Exposure in Securities, Banking, and Nonbank Positions’’ (p. A160).
11. Banking offices in the United States: Gross cross-  
border claims on foreigners and gross cross-border  
liabilities to private foreigners, by nationality of parent  
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between January and June 2009.
European-Owned Banks
The increased net lending abroad between mid-2007
and mid-2008 is mainly attributable to U.S. offices of
European-owned banks lending to their affiliated
offices in Europe. Although U.S. banking offices with
European parents make up less than one-half of U.S.
gross cross-border positions, their increased lending
more than explains the overall pattern for the ﬁrst
year of the crisis (ﬁgure 13, bottom panel). European-
owned offices in the United States generated an
outﬂow of more than $450 billion over the ﬁrst year
of the crisis (ﬁgure 14). Furthermore, almost all of
that new lending was to affiliated offices, often the
parent office.
In the several years prior to the crisis, many
European banks directly or indirectly sponsored more
than 100 special purpose vehicles (SPVs), including
structured investment vehicles (SIVs). These vehicles
issued hundreds of billions of dollars of ABS, includ-
ingABCP, into the U.S. market. WhenABCPmarkets
froze in the fall of 2007, European banks not only lost
a source of new funding, but also needed to pay off
the commercial paper and medium-term notes matur-
ing throughout late 2007 and early 2008 that could
not be rolled over in the market.8 Because many of
the assets backing the commercial paper were illiq-
uid, European banks needed other sources of U.S.
dollars. This need added substantially to the demand
for dollars by European banks at a time when liquid-
ity was at a premium and ﬁnancial markets, including
foreign exchange markets, were under stress from
many angles.
The notion of a dollar liquidity crunch in Europe is
supported by the fact that net lending to Europe
during the ﬁrst year of the crisis was widespread
across many banks, whereas banking ﬂows are usu-
ally dominated by the few largest banks. The U.S.
offices of 30 banks each lent more than $10 billion
abroad, on net, between August 2007 and August
2008.9 Of those banks, 22 were European owned, and
all but 4 had sponsored SPVs.
U.S.-Owned Banks
If Europe had such strong demand for dollars, why
were U.S.-owned banks not also lending to Europe?
8. Although the ABS were liabilities of the SPVs and not of the
banks themselves, most banks chose, as a matter of reputation, to
intervene to support the SPVs they had created.
9. In this analysis, securities brokerage arms that report separately
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A158 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009The net position of U.S.-owned banks changed little
during the ﬁrst year of the crisis, generating a small
net inﬂow. But this result obscures the many ways
that cross-border ﬂows of U.S.-owned banks re-
sponded to the crisis. Some U.S.-owned banks actu-
ally did lend abroad—as much as $235 billion during
the ﬁrst year of the crisis (ﬁgure 15, top panel).
However, those amounts were more than offset by
about $270 billion in inﬂows from other U.S.-owned
institutions that were net borrowers. This latter group
of U.S.-owned banks appears to have borrowed from
foreign affiliates to shore up the liquidity of the parent
bank, similar to the behavior of the European-owned
banks. Presumably their need for liquidity at home
outweighed the proﬁt to be gained from lending
abroad. A majority of the $270 billion in inﬂows
generated by these U.S.-owned net borrowers was
attributable to securities brokers. These institutions
did not have access to borrowing from the Federal
Reserve early in the crisis and likely turned to their
own foreign offices instead for needed cash.
The group of U.S.-owned banks that generated
$235 billion in outﬂows, or net lending, during the
ﬁrst year of the crisis had both increasing gross
cross-border claims and decreasing gross cross-border
liabilities (ﬁgure 15, bottom panel). Looking at each
bank individually suggests that this group encom-
passes two very different sets of banks in terms of
their situation and behavior during the crisis. One set
had increasing gross claims abroad over the ﬁrst year
of the crisis and roughly ﬂat gross liabilities. In
particular, these banks increased their gross claims on
unaffıliated foreigners during this period, suggesting
that they were lending to European banks and not just
their own offices abroad. Such banks presumably had
sufficient liquidity at home to enable them to fulﬁll
some of the dollar demand in Europe.
In contrast, a second set of U.S.-owned banks and
brokers started from a large net borrowing position
(meaning that their liabilities to foreigners were
greater than their claims on foreigners) and then saw
their gross cross-border liabilities plummet nearly
50 percent during the ﬁrst year of the crisis, which
also generated outﬂows. If these institutions were
among those in which the market lost conﬁdence,
such that foreign counterparties were unwilling to
continue lending to them, then these U.S.-owned
banks and brokers would have been forced to pay off
their liabilities to foreigners. This situation is a plau-
sible explanation for the data pattern. Indeed, this set
includes some institutions that eventually required
substantial government rescues or entered bank-
ruptcy. When only net ﬂows are considered, the data
for these two very different sets of U.S.-owned banks
are observationally equivalent. Although only one set
of banks actually lent more abroad, both sets pro-
duced net outﬂows, which are generally referred to as
net lending.
During the ﬁrst year of the crisis, many of the
depository institutions that lent abroad (or generated
outﬂows), both U.S.-owned and European-owned
offices, also borrowed from the Federal Reserve’s
discount window, which included use of the Term
Auction Facility. But even among those banks, aver-
age borrowings from the discount window during that
period equaled at most 10 percent of their net lending
abroad, suggesting that the Federal Reserve was not
the primary source of those funds.
15. Summed net flows and gross positions of U.S.-owned  
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December, 2008
Starting in September 2008, however, the Federal
Reserve began to play a key role in providing dollar
liquidity abroad. In response to the severe dollar
shortage, the Federal Reserve dramatically increased
the availability of dollars to foreign central banks
throughliquidityswapfacilities.Outstandingamounts
drawn on the swap lines reached $288 billion in
September, $534 billion in October, and a peak of
$554 billion at the end of December 2008. More than
three-fourths of these funds were drawn by central
banks in Europe.
Because of the swap lines, the foreign banks that
had been borrowing heavily from their U.S. offices
were able to obtain dollars directly from their own
central banks. In response, the U.S. offices of many of
those foreign banks were able to decrease their lend-
ing position to their parents, receiving a ﬂow of funds
back into the United States between September and
December of 2008. Speciﬁcally, European-owned
banks accounted for inﬂows of about $290 billion
over this period (ﬁgure 16).
The cross-border ﬂows of U.S.-owned banks also
showed the severity of the crisis during this period.
U.S.-owned banks that had been lending early in the
crisis stopped lending. Meanwhile, nearly all securi-
ties brokers, even those that had been able to borrow
from affiliates earlier in the crisis, generated large
outﬂows as their borrowings from foreigners col-
lapsed. These events resulted largely from the break-
down in the market for repos, an important source of
funding for many securities brokers. Finally, U.S.-
owned depository institutions that had been borrow-
ing from their foreign offices abroad also decreased
that borrowing, possibly because more funds were
available at home from the Federal Reserve at the
height of the crisis.
Gradual Improvement in 2009
As the tone of interbank markets began to improve
slowly during the winter, foreign central banks de-
creased their drawings on the swap lines with the
Federal Reserve, leaving $310 billion outstanding at
the end of March and just $114 billion at the end of
June. The decline in the swaps is recorded as an
inﬂow for the United States as the Federal Reserve
decreases its claims on foreign central banks. Private
banking offices in the United States (this time, more
U.S. and Asian banks than European banks) stepped
back in to provide dollar liquidity abroad (ﬁgure 16).
Between January and June of 2009, net bank lending
abroad increased almost dollar for dollar with the
decline in the swaps, an indication that the strength of
demand for dollar funding abroad was undiminished
but that banks regained the ability to provide that
funding through interbank markets in the ﬁrst half of
2009.
Overall, cross-border bank ﬂows reﬂected the crisis
through the channeling of liquidity ‘‘home’’to protect
the parent bank, with European banks generating by
far the strongest net ﬂows from U.S. offices in order
to meet extraordinary demand for dollars in Europe.
This channeling of liquidity and the subsequent
breakdown in interbank markets, failure of banking
institutions, and intervention of central banks re-
ﬂected concerns over risk similar to those we saw in
the cross-border securities ﬂows. These characteris-
tics of the crisis are also apparent in the contraction of
gross banking positions, discussed in the next section.
REDUCTIONS IN FOREIGN EXPOSURE IN
SECURITIES, BANKING, AND NONBANK
POSITIONS
As discussed earlier, increased risk aversion during
the crisis led to notable ﬂight-to-safety ﬂows in
securities portfolios, including net sales of foreign
assets by U.S. investors and net sales of riskier U.S.
assets by foreign investors, as well as ﬂows due to
banks channeling liquidity ‘‘home.’’Flows, of course,
represent changes in positions, so these movements
imply a broad reduction in outstanding cross-border
positions—in other words, a retraction of foreign
exposure. Perhaps surprisingly, however, such reduc-
tions are signiﬁcant only in banking and certain other
nonsecurities positions.
16. Net flows of U.S.-owned and European-owned  
banks and of banks with owners of other nationalities,  
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A160 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009Limited Effects of Recent Sales on Overall
Cross-Border Securities Holdings
Although the ﬁnancial crisis had a marked effect on
the composition of securities ﬂows, the size of cross-
border positions is sufficiently large that the pullback
in cross-border securities holdings resulting from the
record cross-border securities sales last fall shows up
more as a slight ﬂattening out of securities holdings
than as an outright reduction in cross-border expo-
sure. Foreign holdings of U.S. corporate equity, cor-
porate debt, and agency securities moved down some-
what in the second half of 2008, but, on net, total
foreign holdings of securities other than Treasury
securities were little changed from their pre-turmoil
levels (ﬁgure 17, top panel). And total foreign hold-
ings of Treasury securities rose by a more than
offsetting amount, so that total foreign holdings of
U.S. securities actually continued to rise slightly
through the second half of 2008 and in 2009.
These limited reductions in foreign holdings of
U.S. securities are put into perspective when consid-
ered in light of the sizable valuation losses foreign
investors have faced on their cross-border securities
portfolios (ﬁgure 17, bottom panel). While foreign
net acquisitions of corporate and agency securities
left foreign holdings of these securities about un-
changed from summer 2007 through year-end 2008,
adjusting these holdings by incorporating valuation
losses shows a much more pronounced decline.
Cumulative valuation losses on foreign holdings of
these securities from mid-2007 through the end of
2008 were about $1.6 trillion, or roughly 23 percent
of their pre-turmoil value. The recovery in equity
markets and in corporate bond prices in the ﬁrst half
of 2009, however, reversed about $200 billion of
these losses.
We provide a similar analysis of the data on U.S.
holdings of foreign stocks and debt securities (ﬁg-
ure 18). A slight reduction in U.S. holdings resulting
from U.S. net sales of foreign securities is evident in
the second half of 2008, but this pullback in cross-
border positions was just about reversed in the ﬁrst
half of 2009 (ﬁgure 18, top panel). However, U.S.
17. Foreign holdings of U.S. securities adjusted for  
foreign net acquisitions, and such holdings also  
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acquisitions and valuation changes
Equity
Debt
The Financial Crisis and U.S. Cross-Border Financial Flows A161investors faced considerable valuation losses on their
cross-border holdings, especially their holdings of
foreign equity in 2008 (ﬁgure 18, bottom panel).Total
valuation losses are estimated at nearly $2.5 trillion,
or nearly 40 percent of the value as of June 2007.
Most of these losses are valuation losses on foreign
equity, and although foreign equity markets recovered
some in the ﬁrst half of 2009, we estimate that by
June 2009, foreign portfolios of U.S. investors had
recovered only to about where they were in early
2006.
Marked Slowdown in Cross-Border Securities
Trading
Although securities positions were little changed by
cross-border net sales, gross cross-border trading in
U.S. securities was sharply curtailed in the fall of
2008, a further sign of investor caution. In a typical
month, total foreign gross purchases and sales of U.S.
securities greatly exceed net purchases (ﬁgure 19).
From 2005 through mid-2007, gross cross-border
trading, especially of equities and Treasury securities,
grew rapidly, and trading remained at high levels
even after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in the
summer of 2007. With the intensiﬁcation of the crisis
in October 2008, however, gross trading fell back
sharply to the levels last seen in 2005. Trading has
been slow to recover but has picked up a bit in recent
months, at least with respect to Treasury securities.
Drop-Off in Gross Banking Positions
In contrast to the limited pullback in securities posi-
tions, the decline in cross-border banking positions
was substantial. Gross positions declined from their
peaks of early 2008 by about 15 percent for claims
and 30 percent for liabilities (see ﬁgure 10).
A major contributor to the decline in banking
positions was the particularly striking drop in repos,
an important form of short-term interbank lending
(ﬁgure 20). Cross-border repos are primarily under-
taken by securities brokers (included as reporters in
the banking data). The cross-border repo market
ﬂattened out in the ﬁrst three quarters of the crisis but
came under further stress with the collapse of The
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. in March 2008 as fears
about counterparty risk increased. The decline in
repos accelerated dramatically with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008.
From March through December of 2008, cross-border
repo positions shrank 47 percent on the claims side
and 57 percent on the liabilities side. Meanwhile,
other banking positions fell steeply in September and
October of that year as hedge fund liquidations and
concurrent declines in derivatives trading contributed
to a drop in brokerage balances, which are included in
deposits.
Decline in Nonbank Positions
This section addresses pullbacks in positions, exclud-
ing securities and direct investment, of nonbank
entities located in the United States (including indi-
viduals).10 In general, the gross positions of nonbank
entities declined during the crisis as ﬁrms and inves-
tors brought money home, reducing cross-border
10. Positions of nonbank entities are compiled by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA), combining data reported on the TIC
system’s C form, which collects positions of U.S. nonbank ﬁrms with
unaffiliated foreigners, with surveys conducted by the BEA, which
collect positions with affiliated foreigners, plus additional estimates by
BEA staff.
19. Foreign gross purchases and foreign gross sales of  
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A162 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009investments. This decline was a reversal of the trend
for both U.S.-residents’ investments abroad and for-
eign investments in the United States.11
The decrease is evident in the data on the cross-
border loan and bank deposit positions of nonbank
ﬁrms and individuals (ﬁgure 21).12 Here, liabilities
are loans made to U.S. entities by foreigners, mostly
foreign banks (ﬁgure 21, top panel). In the other
direction, claims are loans to foreigners and deposits
in foreign banks made by U.S. entities (ﬁgure 21,
bottom panel).13 Cross-border holdings by nonbanks
of negotiable CDs are also included in this category.
Liabilities (loans to the United States) fell about
10 percent in 2008 and a little further in early 2009.
Claims (loans to foreigners and deposits in foreign
banks) fell more steeply—almost one-third in 2008.
Cross-border commercial positions also exhibited
declines. These positions are primarily trade payables
and advance receipts (liabilities) and trade receiv-
ables and advance payments (claims). The gross level
of commercial positions (not shown) declined about
10 to 20 percent in the second half of 2008 with the
fall in trade and the tightness of trade ﬁnancing.
Cross-border positions of ﬁnancial intermediaries
that are neither banks nor securities brokers also fell
dramatically during the crisis.14 However, as with
securities, the ﬁnancial crisis exacerbated or high-
lighted difficulties in measuring certain nonbank
ﬁnancial ﬂows. This circumstance was particularly
true for positions of the many ﬁnancing vehicles that
were not full-ﬂedged ﬁrms in the sense of having
employees or physical headquarters. During the cri-
sis, the Bureau of Economic Analysis discovered that
many SPVs or SIVs located in offshore ﬁnancial
centers had affiliated vehicles in the United States that
issued securities and loaned the proceeds to the
offshore entities.15 Such direct loans are difficult to
survey. The size of the cross-border position resulting
from these loans is estimated by the amount of
securities issued by the vehicles known to have this
structure. When markets forABCP froze in the fall of
2007, the U.S. vehicles were unable to roll over
short-term debt securities. To pay off maturing secu-
rities, the U.S. vehicles had to reclaim the funds they
had loaned to the offshore entities, thereby creating an
inﬂow of $170 billion in the second half of 2007 and
a signiﬁcant decline in the level of cross-border
claims. Overall, as markets deleveraged and some
vehicles ceased to exist, cross-border claims fell
nearly 40 percent, and liabilities about 23 percent,
from their peaks in 2007 (ﬁgure 22).
11. The decline in foreign holdings of U.S. short-term securities
and the decrease in holdings of foreign commercial paper by U.S.
residents are discussed earlier in the section ‘‘Flight-to-Safety Shifts in
Portfolios during the Crisis’’ (p. A148).
12. The term loans is used broadly to denote other ﬁnancial
positions that are not explicitly securities, negotiable CDs, deposits,
direct investment, or commercial (that is, trade).
13. This category includes both positions for which ﬁrms use a U.S.
bank as a custodian or servicer of their foreign accounts and positions
that U.S. ﬁrms enter into directly with ﬁrms or banks abroad. The
positions that use a U.S. bank as a custodian are reported in the TIC
data and are included in the ﬁnancial account as positions reported by
banks. The positions held directly with foreign counterparties are not
included in the TIC data; in the ﬁnancial account, these are positions
with unaffiliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns.
14. Examples of such entities include insurance ﬁrms, ﬁnancial
management ﬁrms, and securitization vehicles.
15. Intercompany positions are generally considered direct invest-
ment, which is not discussed in this article, except for non-equity
positions between ﬁnancial ﬁrms such as banks, securities brokers, and
ﬁnancing vehicles.
21. Cross-border loan and bank deposit positions of  
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The Financial Crisis and U.S. Cross-Border Financial Flows A163CONCLUSION AND GLOBAL OVERVIEW:
SIMILAR PORTFOLIO SHIFTS IN OTHER
COUNTRY STATISTICS?
U.S. cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows indicate pronounced
ﬂight-to-safety swings in the composition of securi-
ties purchased during the ﬁnancial crisis, with foreign
investors, on net, selling U.S. securities other than
U.S. Treasury securities and U.S. investors, on net,
selling foreign securities, especially in the second half
of 2008. We look next to see whether such shifts in
cross-border securities purchases are also evident in
ﬁnancial ﬂow data for the euro area, the United
Kingdom, and Japan. And although we did not see
much evidence of a pullback in cross-border securi-
ties investment relative to the size of cross-border
holdings in the U.S. data, we consider whether data
for these countries indicate a global pullback in
investment in securities other than those of the home
country of the investor.
Similar to the pattern of cross-border investment
for U.S. investors, investors in both the euro area and
the United Kingdom had made sizable and growing
cross-border securities purchases in the years leading
up to the ﬁnancial turmoil. In both regions, home
investors also reduced their net purchases of ‘‘for-
eign’’ securities (that is, securities issued outside of
the home country) following the onset of the crisis in
2007 and made large net sales of such securities in the
second half of 2008 (ﬁgure 23, top and middle
panels).As ﬁnancial markets stabilized more recently,
these net sales again reversed to show net purchases,
though the reversal through June 2009 is relatively
small for the euro area. Financial ﬂow data for Japan,
however, do not show a similar pullback from foreign
investment (ﬁgure 23, bottom panel). Instead, Japa-
nese investors acquired increasing amounts of foreign
securities through the ﬁrst half of 2008, suggesting
that the ﬁnancial crisis may have affected U.S. and
European investors sooner and to a greater extent
than it did Asian investors. And although global
equity prices fell sharply in the second half of 2008,
Japanese investors increased their purchases of for-
eign equity, though they did reduce their purchases of
foreign bonds.
We also look at foreign investment in the euro area,
the United Kingdom, and Japan to see if the data for
these countries show patterns similar to that for the
United States—that is, reduced foreign purchases of
riskier securities issued by these countries. The pat-
tern of a ﬂight to safety by foreign investors does
seem to be present in the euro-area data: We see a
marked slowdown in purchases of euro-area equities
by foreign investors during the onset of the crisis in
the second half of 2007 and a shift to large sales of
euro-area equity during the intensiﬁcation of the
crisis in the second half of 2008 (ﬁgure 24, top panel).
The euro-area data also show reduced foreign pur-
chases of euro-area bonds, especially in the second
half of 2008. Detail underlying this slowdown indi-
cates offsetting purchases of euro-area sovereign
bonds and sales of other, presumably riskier, euro-
area debt securities. In contrast, foreign inﬂows into
money market instruments jumped sizably in the
second half of 2008. These inﬂows, concentrated in
September and October of 2008, were mostly in the
form of increased foreign purchases of short-term
euro-area government securities, consistent with for-
eign investor demand for safer or more-liquid invest-
ments during the intensiﬁcation of the ﬁnancial crisis.
The Japanese data also suggest ﬂight to safety, as they
22. Cross-border positions of nonbank financial  
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A164 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009show net sales of Japanese equity and large inﬂows
into liquid money market instruments beginning in
the summer of 2007 and then a switch to net sales of
all types of Japanese securities by foreign investors in
the second half of 2008 (ﬁgure 24, bottom panel).
Evidence of such ﬂight-to-safety ﬂows is less
apparent in the U.K. data, as foreign purchases of
U.K. equity appear to have been less inﬂuenced by
market swings (ﬁgure 24, middle panel). The U.K.
data also indicate continued strong foreign purchases
of long-term U.K. debt securities, even in the second
half of 2008. However, detail underlying these ﬁgures
shows a shift in the composition of foreign purchases
that is similar to the shift evident in the euro-area data:
23. Cross-border portfolio investment: Domestic net  
acquisitions of foreign securities for the euro area, the  
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the European Central Bank, U.K. Office for National Statistics, and Bank of
Japan via Haver Analytics. 
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24. Cross-border portfolio investment: Foreign net  
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The Financial Crisis and U.S. Cross-Border Financial Flows A165Foreign investors’ purchases of U.K. government
securities picked up in the second half of 2008, while
their purchases of debt securities issued by ﬁnancial
institutions fell sharply and remained weak in the ﬁrst
half of 2009.
But as with the U.S. data, these effects on the
composition of cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows in other
industrial countries do not indicate a signiﬁcant pull-
back in the overall size of such countries’ cross-
border securities positions (ﬁgure 25). In the euro
area and the United Kingdom, recent reductions in
holdings of foreign securities arising from sales of
foreign securities (thin lines) are small relative to the
size of holdings and compared with the actual move-
25. Cross-border portfolio investment: Domestic holdings  
of foreign securities adjusted for domestic net  
acquisitions for the euro area, the United Kingdom,  
and Japan, and such holdings also adjusted for  
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SOURCE: Staff estimates from international investment positions and
balance of payments accounts as reported by the European Central Bank,
U.K. Office for National Statistics, and Bank of Japan via Haver Analytics. 
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A166 Federal Reserve Bulletin h November 2009ments in investment positions incorporating valuation
changes (thick lines). And the reduction in foreign
holdings of Japanese securities arising from foreign
sales of such securities since mid-2008 also is quite
small, especially relative to valuation losses incurred
on these holdings (ﬁgure 26).
Similarly, the fall in cross-border banking activity
evident in the U.S. data was mirrored by declines in
banking activity around the globe. The external (that
is, cross-border) claims of all banks located in coun-
tries reporting to the Bank for International Settle-
ments fell about 8 percent between March and
December of 2008.16 Declines early in the year were
concentrated in the United States and the United
Kingdom, but in the fourth quarter, sizable drops
occurred in the euro area, developing countries, and
offshore ﬁnancial centers as well.
With the improvement in the tone of ﬁnancial
markets so far in 2009, many of the unusual cross-
border ﬁnancial ﬂows generated by the ﬁnancial crisis
appear to be reversing. U.S. and foreign data indicate
that investors are making renewed purchases of
riskier foreign securities such as equities and that
purchases are no longer concentrated in safer and
more-liquid short-term government debt securities.
Increased cross-border interbank lending and the con-
current decline in central bank swaps indicate that
banks are again able to provide funding through
interbank markets. However, cross-border data to
date also indicate some longer-lasting effects of the
ﬁnancial crisis. The slow recovery in interbank repo
positions and still-subdued gross cross-border securi-
ties trading suggest continued investor caution. More-
over, many of the institutions directly affected by the
crisis—SPVs and SIVs active in the issuance of
ABS—were located in offshore ﬁnancial centers, and
the unwinding of their activity and the closure of
some of these entities have had a notable effect on the
size of nonbank cross-border positions. And because
much of the pre-crisis growth in cross-border pur-
chases of corporate debt securities was in the form of
corporate ABS, the disruption in corporate ABS mar-
kets and the curtailment of corporate ABS issuance
show through as signiﬁcantly reduced foreign pur-
chases of corporate debt securities.
16. See the ﬁgure ‘‘Cross-border positions’’ in Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (2009), BIS Quarterly Review, ‘‘StatisticalAnnex,’’
table 1A (Basel, Switzerland: BIS, June), p. A4, www.bis.org/publ/
qtrpdf/r_qs0906.pdf.
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